China’s rise and New Zealand’s interests: a policy primer for 2030

In this study, we seek to do three things. First, we examine what we believe China’s economic, political and military trajectory will resemble between now and the early 2030s. Second, we contemplate the effects that this trajectory for China will have on international institutions and Asia-Pacific regional affairs. Third, we propose a series of issues that New Zealand’s policy-makers will need to bear in mind. The emergence of China as an international power in the early decades of the 21st century is widely accepted as the consequence of economic, political and military trends which are already apparent today. The familiar patterns of power centred on western predominance and American leadership will no longer offer the reassurance they once did. Dealing with a prosperous and powerful China, which is by no means a novelty in world history, is commonly accepted as the main foreign policy adjustment that needs to be made by all countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The effects of China’s rise on the global and Asia-Pacific regional order are likely to be the main preoccupations for New Zealand foreign policy-makers in the next twenty years and more

Neighbours, Allies and Giants: Three Themes in Australian Strategic Thinking

Australian strategic thinking is a challenging balancing act between three priorities: local developments in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood, alliance commitments at the global level and coping with the rise of the Asian giants. Australian strategic thinkers are simultaneously preoccupied by developments in three main arenas. First, concerns about instability in the South Pacific and East Timor have given rise to the commitment of Australian forces in the immediate region. Secondly, the short-term costs to Canberra of sustaining the valuable alliance with the US have increased as Washington has expected Australian commitments to coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Third, with the rise of China and India, the continuation of America’s strong but less preponderant regional role, and Japan’s relative position at a turning point, Asia is becoming a region of giants where the strategic balance is changing significantly. This paper argues that the effectiveness of Australian strategic policy depends on the choices Canberra makes about the allocation of precious attention and resources across and between these arenas which often generate competing pressures on Australia’s force structure. The newly elected government of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd faces some interesting choices. As Australian force levels are reduced in Iraq and retained in Afghanistan, to what extent will capabilities chosen for these sorts of commitments be favoured? Will Mr Rudd’s government place increasing emphasis on Australia’s capacity to mount and lead stabilisation operations in its immediate neighbourhood. Or will the bulk of Australia’s capital expenditure on defence be directed to the long-term acquisition of advanced maritime capabilities in light of Asia’s evolving strategic balance? Given the importance and timeframe of the giants’ rise, the last of these might turn out to be the dominant factor

The Economics-Security Nexus Under Trump and Xi: Policy Implications for Asia-Pacific Countries

In this Centre of Gravity paper, Professor Robert Aysons explores how the links between economic and security considerations are intensifying in Asia. Yet, rather than anticipating an all-or-nothing choice between security interests with the US and economic interests with China, he shows that many Asia-Pacific countries have been making smaller choices to work with both great powers to encourage a regional equilibrium. The paper also explores how North Korea's nuclear and missile provocations have also encouraged some economics-security cooperation between China and the US in the Trump Xi era. For policymakers in middle and smaller sized states, Professor Ayson urges an attempt to deepen their bilateral and plurilateral collaboration to reduce their exposure to the changing mix of pressure and reassurance coming from Beijing and Washington

Strategy and its discontents: the place of strategy in national policymaking

This paper presents a collection of views about the definition, role, purpose and health of strategic policymaking. Introduction One of the liveliest debates to have taken place on ASPI’s blog, The Strategist, concerned the place of strategy in Canberra’s policymaking community. It seems that there’s little consensus around what strategy’s core business should be, let alone who should practice it and whether indeed enough strategy is being done by DFAT, Defence or other parts of government. The 11 short pieces printed here by eight authors with quite diverse perspectives span a broad range of views about the definition, role, purpose and health of strategic policymaking. There’s no more important debate in public policy than on the place of strategy in meeting complex national challenges. This paper hopefully will encourage a more structured debate about strategy’s place at the heart of national policymaking

Part of the pivot? The Washington Declaration and US-NZ relations

For more about the East-West Center, see http://www.eastwestcenter.org/Robert Ayson, Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, and David Capie, Senior Lecturer at the School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations, both at the Victoria University of Wellington, explain “that while New Zealand has not returned to a formal alliance status in an ANZUS context, it is now very clearly a de facto ally of the United States.